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SMITH, Chief Judge.   
 This appeal requires us to answer a question about the 
“three strikes rule” of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which was left unresolved by 
the Supreme Court in Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759 
(2015): may an indigent prisoner appealing a District Court’s 
imposition of his “third strike” proceed in forma pauperis 
(“IFP”) for that appeal without demonstrating that he is in 
imminent danger of serious physical injury?  We conclude, 
based upon the plain text of the statute, and guided by the 
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in Coleman, that we must answer 
this question in the negative.  Accordingly, we will deny 
Parker’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 
I. 
 Congress enacted the PLRA in an effort to stem a rising 
tide of prisoner suits flooding the federal court system.  See 
Title VIII, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), 
amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915–1915A; see also Woodford v. 
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 
F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).  Because “Congress 
concluded that the large number of meritless prisoner claims 
was caused by the fact that prisoners easily obtained I.F.P. 
status and hence were not subject to the same economic 
disincentives to filing meritless cases that face other civil 
litigants,” Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 312, the PLRA increases 
the economic burdens of civil litigation for prisoners.     
 Among other things, the PLRA requires a prisoner who 
files a civil complaint or appeal in federal court to pay the full 
amount of any applicable filing and docketing fees.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(b)(1).  A prisoner who is indigent may be granted IFP 
status and thereby be excused from pre-payment of fees.  IFP 
status does not, however, eliminate the filing and docketing fee 
obligations.  Rather, it permits the prisoner to pay an initial 
partial fee followed by subsequent monthly installments until 
the fees are paid in full.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (2).   
 In addition, the PLRA imposes the “three strikes rule,” 
which “limits a prisoner’s ability to proceed I.F.P. if the 
prisoner abuses the judicial system by filing frivolous actions.”  
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Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 312.  The rule applies to those 
prisoners who are the most frequent filers of meritless civil 
suits and appeals in federal courts as follows: 
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or 
appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding 
under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or 
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 
detained in any facility, brought an action or 
appeal in a court of the United States that was 
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, 
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is 
under imminent danger of serious physical 
injury. 
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  “The ‘three strikes’ provision was 
‘designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate 
consideration of the good.’”  Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1764 
(quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)).  
II. 
 Jason Parker, an indigent prisoner,2 has been a prolific 
pro se litigant in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
                                                 
2 Parker’s six-month prisoner account statement, filed in 
October 2015 in support of his IFP motion, reflects a balance 
that is below the amount required for filing and docketing an 
appeal.  It is almost certain that Parker is indigent and, but for 




District of Pennsylvania, where he initiated as many as forty 
civil matters over a relatively short period of time.  For current 
purposes, we need focus on only three of those proceedings. 
 In late 2014, Parker filed a complaint in Parker v. 
Nutter, No. 2:14-cv-07113 (E.D. Pa.) (“Nutter”), in which he 
claimed that various officials subjected him to false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, and the use of excessive force in the 
course of his arrest in December 2011.  He accompanied the 
complaint with a motion to proceed IFP.  By order entered 
March 19, 2015, the District Court granted the IFP motion and 
considered the case pursuant to the PLRA’s IFP screening 
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which directs a court to dismiss 
a case “at any time” if it determines that the “action or appeal 
is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief 
may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant 
who is immune from such relief.”  Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).  
The District Court concluded that Parker’s claims were barred 
by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations and therefore 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice pursuant to 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Parker did not appeal the dismissal.3  This 
was Parker’s first strike. 
 Parker’s next strikes stem from two civil rights 
complaints that he filed in the summer of 2015, and which 
underlie the appeals before us.  In the first complaint, Parker 
v. O’Connor, No. 2:15-cv-03475 (E.D. Pa.) (“O’Connor”), 
                                                 
3 Parker filed an appeal from a subsequent post-judgment 
motion for the appointment of counsel, but the appeal was 
dismissed for failure to prosecute.  See Parker v. Nutter, No. 
15-3203 (3d Cir. dismissed Nov. 23, 2015). 
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Parker claimed—as he had in Nutter—that officials subjected 
him to assault, false arrest, and malicious prosecution in the 
course of his December 2011 arrest.  In the second complaint, 
Parker v. Montgomery County Correctional Facility,  No. 
2:15-cv-04205 (E.D. Pa.) (“MCC”), Parker claimed that prison 
officials interfered with his access to the courts by depriving 
him of prisoner account statements necessary to perfect IFP 
motions in his pending litigation.  In both O’Connor and MCC, 
Parker moved to proceed IFP.  He was initially denied that 
status without prejudice due to a failure to provide the required 
prisoner account statement, but in both cases, he later filed the 
necessary documents.  The District Court then granted the IFP 
motions and screened both complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).   
 On September 17, 2015, the District Court entered a 
memorandum opinion and order in each proceeding, 
dismissing them both.  The District Court concluded that 
O’Connor was malicious “because it repeats previously 
litigated claims”—namely, the claims Parker had presented in 
Nutter.  JA 12a.  In addition, to the extent O’Connor included 
several additional defendants not previously named in Nutter, 
the District Court concluded that the claims against those 
defendants were frivolous because the new defendants did not 
have any involvement with the events giving rise to his claims.  
The District Court therefore dismissed O’Connor as frivolous, 
malicious, and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).  This was Parker’s second strike.4 
                                                 
4 Because the dismissals in O’Connor and MCC occurred on 
the same day, it is not possible to determine from the record 
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 In MCC, the District Court concluded that, because 
Parker eventually received the prisoner account statements he 
required, he could not establish any injury: “[h]e has not 
described any non-frivolous cases that he was prohibited from 
pursuing because he could not obtain his prison account 
statement.”  JA 19a–20a.  Accordingly, the District Court 
dismissed MCC for failure to state a claim pursuant to 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and, because it determined that amendment 
would be futile, did not grant leave to amend.  This was 
Parker’s third strike. 
 Parker timely filed these pro se appeals from the 
O’Connor and MCC judgments.  Parker filed motions to 
proceed IFP in both matters, as well as motions for the 
appointment of counsel.  Because the two dismissals are 
Parker’s second and third strikes under § 1915(g), the Clerk of 
this Court directed him to file a motion demonstrating 
imminent danger of serious physical injury.  Parker complied.   
 Parker’s IFP motions, counsel motions, and imminent 
danger motions were submitted to a panel of this Court.  In 
response, the Court entered an order on March 24, 2016, 
which: (1) consolidated the appeals for briefing; (2) 
provisionally granted Parker’s IFP motions, solely for the 
purpose of considering his counsel motions, and deferred 
assessment of the appeal fees5; (3) granted the counsel 
                                                 
which strike is technically Parker’s second and which is his 
third.  We refer in this opinion to O’Connor as the second strike 
and MCC as the third merely for expediency. 
5 Our discussion in this opinion concerns Parker’s ability to 
proceed IFP for purposes of avoiding the pre-payment of filing 
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motions; (4) directed counsel to address, “in addition to any 
other issues counsel may wish to raise,” the question left 
unanswered by Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1765, i.e., “whether the 
IFP statute affords a prisoner IFP status with respect to an 
appeal from a third qualifying dismissal under § 1915”; and, 
finally, (5) referred the IFP and imminent danger motions to 
the merits panel.   
 Peter C. Buckley, Esq., and Ryan T. Becker, Esq., 
appeared as pro bono counsel for Parker.6  Initially, because 
these appeals were from screening decisions made by the 
District Court prior to any defendant entering an appearance, 
no appellee participated in either matter.  At the direction of 
the Court, the Clerk issued an order inviting Montgomery 
County to participate by way of a special appearance.7  The 
                                                 
and docketing fees.  We have no occasion today to review the 
correctness of the motion panel’s earlier decision to 
provisionally grant Parker IFP status for the purpose of the 
appointment of pro bono counsel. 
 
6 We extend our gratitude to Mr. Buckley and Mr. Becker of 
Fox Rothschild LLP for donating their time and talent in 
accepting this pro bono appointment. 
  
7 Montgomery County was not served in the underlying 
District Court proceeding, as the complaint was dismissed 
pursuant to § 1915(e) prior to service.  The Clerk’s order 
specified that participation in the appeal “will not be construed 




County accepted the invitation and filed a responsive brief. 
 At oral argument, counsel for Parker advised the Court 
that Parker has abandoned his appeal in O’Connor.  That 
matter will therefore be dismissed in an accompanying order.  
Accordingly, only MCC—Parker’s appeal of the District 
Court’s imposition of his third strike—remains before us.  And, 
before we may consider whether that appeal has merit, we must 
decide whether Parker is entitled to IFP status for his appeal, 
despite the three strikes imposed by the District Court.8 
III.  
We consider de novo issues concerning the proper 
application of the three strikes rule.  See Millhouse, --- F.3d at 
---, 2017 WL 3319795 at *3.  Because interpretation of that 
rule has undergone recent and substantial change, we first 
review some relevant history. 
Several years ago, in Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 
464–65 (3d Cir. 2013), we held, among other things, that a 
strike does not accrue at the moment that a District Court 
dismisses a prisoner’s complaint on an enumerated ground.  
Instead, we determined that a District Court’s imposition of a 
                                                 
8 During oral argument, counsel advised the Court that Parker 
was released from prison.  Because the applicability of the 
three strikes rule is determined as of the date that the notice of 
appeal is filed, Millhouse v. Heath, --- F.3d ---, 2017 WL 
3319795 at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 4, 2017), and because Parker was 
a prisoner at that time, Parker’s subsequent release does not 
impact our discussion of § 1915(g). 
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strike “counts” for purposes of § 1915(g) only after that 
judgment has been affirmed on appeal or the window for 
pursuing an appeal has closed.  Although the opposite outcome 
might have been more consistent with a “hyper-literal” reading 
of § 1915(g), we reasoned that to hold otherwise would “risk 
inadvertently punishing nonculpable conduct” by preventing 
an appeal from an erroneous third-strike dismissal or by 
allowing a prisoner litigant’s fourth claim to unfairly expire 
before an improperly awarded strike could be reversed on 
appeal.  Id. at 465 (quoting Jennings v. Natrona Cty. Det. 
Center Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999)).  Our 
holding in Ball was consistent with decisions by the other 
Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue, including the 
Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.  Id. (citing cases). 
Later that year, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit considered the same question and reached the 
opposite conclusion.  André Lee Coleman, a Michigan 
prisoner, had filed three federal lawsuits that were dismissed 
on grounds enumerated in § 1915(g).  While his appeal of the 
third dismissal was pending, he filed four new lawsuits, 
moving to proceed in forma pauperis in each.  The District 
Court denied him IFP status pursuant to § 1915(g) and 
dismissed his complaints for failure to pay the applicable fees, 
concluding that a dismissal counts as a strike even while it is 
pending on appeal.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed.  See Coleman 
v. Tollefson, 733 F.3d 175, 177 (6th Cir. 2013).  Recognizing 
that the Sixth Circuit’s decision gave rise to a circuit split, the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, partially abrogating our analysis 
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in Ball and marking a sea change in the interpretation of the 
three strikes rule.9  Coleman, 135 S. Ct. 1759.  The Court held 
that the literal reading of § 1915(g) that we had rejected in Ball 
is precisely what is required in deciding when a strike takes 
effect: “[a] prior dismissal on a statutorily enumerated ground 
counts as a strike even if the dismissal is the subject of an 
appeal.  That, after all, is what the statute literally says.”  Id. at 
1763.   
Before the Supreme Court, Coleman argued that use of 
the phrase “prior occasion” in § 1915(g) gives rise to ambiguity 
because it “may refer to a single moment or to a continuing 
event: to an appeal, independent of the underlying action, or to 
the continuing claim, inclusive of both the action and its 
appeal.”  Id.  The Supreme Court rejected Coleman’s view, 
discerning no ambiguity.  “Linguistically speaking, we see 
nothing about the phrase ‘prior occasions’ that would 
transform a dismissal into a dismissal-plus-appellate-review.”  
Id.   
According to the Supreme Court, the statute does not 
treat a qualifying dismissal as provisional pending appeal, but 
rather speaks only to whether an action or appeal “was 
dismissed”—a term that “does not normally include 
subsequent appellate activity” and which “describes . . . an 
action taken by a single court, not . . . a sequence of events 
involving multiple courts.”  Id.  The Court reasoned that this 
                                                 
9 Coleman abrogates Ball only insofar as Ball addressed 
the issue of tabulating strikes while an appeal is pending.  
Ball’s other holdings remain undisturbed.  
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literal reading is also supported by “the way in which the law 
ordinarily treats trial court judgments,” inasmuch as a District 
Court’s judgment takes immediate effect regardless of a 
pending appeal.  Id. at 1764.  In addition, the Court concluded 
that its interpretation comports with the purpose of § 1915(g): 
“The ‘three strikes’ provision was ‘designed to filter out the 
bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.’  To refuse 
to count a prior dismissal because of a pending appeal would 
produce a leaky filter.”  Id. (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 204).  
The Supreme Court acknowledged that its interpretation 
creates a risk that a prisoner could be deprived of IFP status in 
suits filed after a District Court’s erroneous imposition of a 
strike but before that strike’s reversal on appeal.  Id.  But the 
Court observed that such reversals are rare and that the prisoner 
might be able to re-file or re-open his or her suit after the 
reversal in any event.  Id.  Coleman countered by arguing that 
this interpretation could give rise to a more concrete and 
substantial risk: it could deny a prisoner IFP status for, and 
therefore effectively bar appellate review of, the District 
Court’s imposition of the prisoner’s third strike.   
The Solicitor General, who had filed an amicus brief 
supporting the literal reading of the statute ultimately adopted 
by the Court, agreed with Coleman that the ability to appeal the 
imposition of a third strike should be preserved.  To that end, 
the Solicitor General offered an interpretation of the word 
“prior” that, he argued, could reach that result:   
The Solicitor General says that we can and 
should read the statute to afford a prisoner in 
forma pauperis status with respect to a third 
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qualifying dismissal . . . .    He believes that the 
statute, in referring to dismissals ‘on three or 
more prior occasions,’ means that a trial court 
dismissal qualifies as a strike only if it occurred 
in a prior, different, lawsuit.   
Id. at 1765. 
Because the question of a prisoner’s ability to be 
granted IFP status for the purposes of his appeal of the 
imposition of a third strike was not directly before the Supreme 
Court, it declined to consider the issue.  “We need not, and do 
not, now decide whether the Solicitor General’s interpretation 
(or some other interpretation with the same result) is correct.”  
Id.   
Today, that issue is squarely before us. 
IV. 
 Since Coleman, the only Court of Appeals to have 
considered this question has concluded that a prisoner is 
entitled to IFP status while appealing his third strike dismissal.  
In Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth 
Circuit fully endorsed the interpretation of § 1915(g) that the 
Solicitor General put forth in Coleman, concluding that the 
phrase “prior occasions” refers to “strikes imposed in prior-
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filed suits, not . . . those imposed in an earlier stage of the same 
suit.”10  Id. at 1209.   
 The Richey Court’s rationale for its holding was a desire 
to be consistent with “the way in which the law ordinarily treats 
trial court judgments.”  Id. (quoting Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 
1764).  The Court reasoned, “[w]hile judgments are 
immediately preclusive as to successive suits, they are 
certainly not preclusive to the panel on appeal.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  In addition, the Richey Court observed that its rule 
would not run afoul of the Supreme Court’s concern in 
                                                 
10 The Tenth Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, but only 
in unpublished decisions.  Dawson v. Coffman, 651 F. App’x 
840, 842 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016) (“A dismissal would not be 
considered “prior” if it is the decision underlying the appeal.”); 
Burnett v. Miller, 631 F. App’x 591, 604 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(same).  Pursuant to the Local Rules of the Tenth Circuit, an 
unpublished decision is not precedential.  See 10th Cir. R. 
32.1(A).  The Tenth Circuit’s decisions cite Pigg v. FBI, 106 
F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam), a pre-Coleman case 
that has not been reconsidered in a post-Coleman precedential 
decision.  We note that the Fourth Circuit, following Pigg, 
adopted the Richey-like view of “prior occasion” in Henslee v. 
Keller, 681 F.3d 538, 543 (4th Cir. 2012), and that the Sixth 
Circuit also did so in the decision that Coleman affirmed.  See 
Coleman, 733 F.3d at 178 (“A third strike that is on appeal is 
not a prior occasion for the purposes of that appeal, because it 
is the same occasion.”).  Neither the Fourth Circuit nor the 
Sixth Circuit has, at the time of writing, commented on 
Coleman’s effect on Circuit precedent. 
 16 
 
Coleman about a “leaky filter,” because it only permits the 
appeal of the third strike itself.  Id.     
 In its brief analysis, which is noticeably lacking in 
discussion of the statutory language, the Richey Court appears 
to be primarily motivated by a policy consideration: a contrary 
rule would prevent courts of appeals from performing their 
“appellate function” by “freez[ing] out meritorious claims or 
ossify[ing] district court errors.”  Id. (quoting Henslee v. 
Keller, 681 F.3d 538, 543 (4th Cir. 2012)).  The Ninth Circuit 
determined that such an outcome would be unfair, as 
exemplified in Richey’s very case, because his third strike was, 
indeed, erroneously imposed:   
If Richey was not entitled to IFP status on appeal, 
he would have to pay the filing fee for us to 
reverse the district court’s erroneous third strike, 
which would ironically make him eligible again 
for IFP status in successive suits.  We do not 
think that Congress intended such a peculiar 
system.   
Id.   
 Such perceived unfairness, rather than the language of 
§ 1915(g) itself, appears to have driven the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision. 
V. 
 We are not unsympathetic to the concerns that 
motivated the Ninth Circuit in Richey.  Yet, as a Court of 
 17 
 
Appeals, we must adhere to the apparent intent of Congress as 
embodied in the language of § 1915(g).  We must also adhere 
to Coleman’s instruction to read that language literally.  In light 
of these weighty considerations, we must respectfully reject the 
view espoused by the Ninth Circuit.  “While we are generally 
reluctant to create circuit splits, we do so where a ‘compelling 
basis’ exists.” Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 
61, 75 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Wagner v. PennWest Farm 
Credit, ACA, 109 F.3d 909, 912 (3d Cir. 1997)).  A compelling 
basis exists here.  
 We direct our focus to the language of the statute.  See 
Bd. of Trustees of IBT Local 863 Pension Fund v. C&S 
Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 802 F.3d 534, 542 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the 
statute and when the language is clear, the court ‘must enforce 
it according to its terms.’” (quoting Jimenez v. Quarterman, 
555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009))).  By its terms, § 1915(g) applies 
when “the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, . . . 
brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that 
was dismissed on . . . grounds” enumerated in 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or (ii).  Parker undisputedly has brought 
three “actions” that were dismissed on enumerated grounds—
yielding the strikes in Nutter, O’Connor, and MCC.  Under 
Coleman, these dismissals are three “prior occasions,” and they 
bar him from proceeding IFP in “bringing a civil action or 
appeal” going forward.  Yet, Parker wishes to proceed IFP in 
bringing this appeal.   
 We first observe what the statute does not do, and what 
the statute easily could have done if Congress had intended it: 
the statute does not create an express exception to § 1915(g) 
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treating an appeal from an order imposing a third strike 
differently from any other instance in which the prisoner 
wishes to bring an action or appeal.  There is simply no 
language discussing this scenario, although Congress surely 
must have anticipated that prisoners would file appeals from 
third strike dismissals.   
 Despite this textual void, Parker argues, adopting the 
logic of the Solicitor General in his Coleman amicus brief, that 
“[t]he plain meaning interpretation of the phrase ‘prior 
occasions’ in this context is most reasonably read to refer to 
lawsuits that were instituted before the current lawsuit.”  
Parker Br. at 19.  Quoting the Solicitor General’s amicus brief 
in Coleman, Parker contends that the word “prior” “refer[s] to 
strikes imposed in prior-filed suits, not to those imposed in an 
earlier stage in the same suit.”  Id. at 20. 
We cannot square Parker’s proposed interpretation with 
either the language of § 1915(g) or the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Coleman.  As Parker acknowledges, the word 
“prior” simply means “earlier in time.”  See Webster’s Ninth 
New Collegiate Dictionary 936 (9th ed. 1990).  A dismissal in 
a district court is, of course, earlier in time than an appeal of 
that dismissal—and therefore “prior” to the appeal.  Moreover, 
the statute speaks of “prior occasions.”  In its unanimous 
decision, the Coleman Court recognized that “actions” and 
“appeals” are treated separately, and must each be considered 
distinct “occasions.”  Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1763.  This leads 
us to the inescapable conclusion that the imposition of a third 
strike in a district court is an “occasion” that is “prior” to its 
appeal, and that § 1915(g) therefore must apply to an appeal 
from the imposition of a third strike.   
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In Parker’s view, although he has had cases dismissed 
on enumerated grounds on three “occasions,” only two of them 
were “prior” to this appeal.  To reach that result, Parker 
contends that “prior” does not refer to “occasions” at all, but 
rather to “actions or appeals filed prior to the action that is on 
appeal.”  Parker Br. at 19.  As a matter of grammar, it is clear 
that “prior” modifies “occasions,” and the text does not refer 
to “prior lawsuits.”   We fail to see how we could agree with 
Parker’s proposed interpretation without re-writing the statute.     
Parker also contends that interpreting “prior occasions” 
to include all occasions, even the underlying dismissal, would 
render the term “prior” superfluous and would therefore run 
contrary to our duty to give effect to every word of the statute.  
See Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2390 (2014) 
(recognizing the “cardinal principle” of statutory 
interpretation, requiring courts to “give effect, if possible, to 
every clause and word of a statute” (quoting Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000))).  We disagree.   
In our view, the term “prior” sets a temporal parameter, 
referring only to strikes accrued earlier in time than the notice 
of appeal.  All later-accrued strikes—even if imposed after the 
filing of the notice of appeal but before the prisoner’s IFP 
motion is decided—are not “prior” strikes, and therefore do not 
“count” for purposes of the three strikes rule.  Millhouse, --- 
F.3d at ---, 2017 WL 3319795 at *1 (“Strikes that accrue before 
the filing of the notice of appeal count as strikes—while strikes 
that accrue after the notice of appeal is filed do not.”).  If the 
statute did not include the term “prior,” then any strikes, 
including those issued after a prisoner files an appeal but before 
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IFP status is awarded or denied, could contribute to the strike 
count.11  Thus, in our view, “prior” has meaning.  
In sum, based upon the plain language of § 1915(g), we 
think it clear that Parker “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, . . 
. brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that 
was dismissed on . . . grounds” enumerated in 
§1915(e)(2)(B)(i) or (ii).  We therefore conclude that he is 
subject to the restrictions set forth in § 1915(g) for purposes of 
this appeal. 
VI. 
 We recognize that, as a practical matter, most indigent 
prisoners who are denied IFP status will be unable to pre-pay 
the fees.  Accordingly, our decision today means that some 
prisoners will be unable to challenge the imposition of a third 
strike, even though a wrongly imposed third strike would have 
long-term consequences for that prisoner’s ability to bring 
cases IFP going forward.  We have held, however, that 
requiring a prisoner to pre-pay fees does not amount to a 
                                                 
11 In fact, Parker appears to have received at least two 
additional strikes while this appeal was pending.  See generally 
Parker v. Boring, No. 1:15-cv-01784, 2016 WL 3381287 
(M.D. Pa. May 19, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 
2016 WL 3227250 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2016); Parker v. 
Banner, No. 1:15-CV-01808, 2016 WL 4870505 (M.D. Pa. 
July 25, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 
4765964 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2016).  Under our reading of the 
statute, neither of these strikes “counts” in assessing Parker’s 
IFP eligibility on appeal. 
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violation of the right of access to the courts.  Abdul-Akbar, 239 
F.3d at 317 (“[T]he right of access to the courts is not absolute. 
. . .  [M]erely requiring a prisoner to pay filing fees in a civil 
case does not, standing alone, violate that prisoner’s right of 
meaningful access to the courts.”).   
 More importantly, regardless of any concern we may 
have with this outcome, it is our duty to give effect to the plain 
language of the statute.  See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (“[W]here, as here, the statute’s 
language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce 
it according to its terms.’” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).  As we observed in our en banc 
decision in Abdul-Akbar,  
Congress has deliberately decided to legislate on 
this subject by proclaiming, as public policy, a 
determination to reduce prisoner litigation in the 
federal courts.  As citizens, we may disagree with 
the congressional wisdom, but as judges, 
knowing the clearly stated legislative purpose, 
we may not disembowel the legislative act.  
Federal courts . . . do not have unlimited power 
and authority.  We are limited to that which has 
been granted by Congress.  What Congress gives 
it may also take away.  The ability to proceed 
I.F.P. is not a constitutional right.  Congress 
granted the right to proceed I.F.P. in 1892, and it 
has the power to limit this statutorily created 
right.  Here it has taken away our ability as 
judges to grant I.F.P. status to a “three strikes” 
prisoner . . . .  Congress has held trump here, and 
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it has dealt a hand.  As judges we must play it. 
239 F.3d at 315–16.  We have no choice but to echo that 
sentiment today.  
VII. 
 For all of the foregoing reasons, and as set forth in our 
accompanying order, we will deny Parker’s motion to proceed 
in forma pauperis in MCC, appeal No. 15-3449.  We will also 
deny Parker’s motion invoking the imminent danger exception 
to § 1915(g).12  Accordingly, before we may consider the 
merits of this appeal, Parker must pay the full amount of the 
applicable filing and docketing fees in the District Court within 
fourteen days of our order.  Should Parker pay the fees, this 
panel will retain jurisdiction to decide the merits of the MCC 
appeal—which, we note, has been fully briefed by counsel and 
is ripe for disposition.  Should Parker fail to pay the fees as 
                                                 
12 “[A] prisoner may invoke the ‘imminent danger’ exception 
only to seek relief from a danger which is ‘imminent’ at the 
time the complaint is filed.”  Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 312.  In 
his motion, Parker argues that MCC’s delay in providing him 
financial information prolonged his stay in prison, which is a 
hostile and dangerous environment.  Although prison can 
undoubtedly be a dangerous place, incarceration alone does not 
satisfy the requirement of “imminent danger of serious 
physical injury” for purposes of § 1915(g).  Indeed, if it did, 
every prisoner would be entitled to IFP status and the exception 
would swallow the rule.  See id. at 315 (rejecting a proposed 




instructed, we will direct the Clerk to close the MCC appeal 
without further notice.  
 Finally, as previously discussed, counsel advised the 
Court during oral argument that Parker has abandoned the 
O’Connor appeal.  Accordingly, as set forth in the 
accompanying order, we will dismiss O’Connor, No. 15-3451, 
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). 
 
